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1 Introduction
The role of institutions and their strategies for triggering economic development are topics that
have been widely discussed in the economic literature. In the case of developing countries,
it is widely known that foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most e¤ective tools for
endorsing the development process. The principal limitation to FDI inows in these countries,
however, is market risk which entails serious concerns about prots when settling economic
activities in developing countries (Markusen, 2002). Therefore, in this context, the presence of
an international institution supporting capital ow entry is often considered an e¤ective deterrent
to market risk.
This paper investigates the determinants of capital entry in a selected sample of countries,
namely, the ex-socialist countries, as an e¤ective device for endorsing their economic develop-
ment and the creation of a market system. We dene market system as the existence of a
competitive interaction among sellers and buyers in the spirit of a competitive economic ex-
change process. Under this perspective, foreign rms (namely, multinational rms) investing in
ex-socialist countries and bringing a competitive culture with them have been expected to be a
catalyst for consolidating the market economy during the transition period.
The core of the evidence we discuss in this study consistes of the analysis of the capital
ow directed to these countries, intermediated by an international institution: the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (EBRD). Our argument is that the EBRD adopted
a tailored lending strategy by selecting the FDI option as one of the principal driving forces for
the creation of a market system in a risky environment.
Our approach is original and novel: we exploit information about the credit contracts granted
by the EBRD to tackle a more general question, namely, the capital entry selection as a strategic
tool for development. We adopt a two-step strategy. First, we create an original database by
organizing the public information on these credit contracts. The contracts include loans and
other types of nancing tools that the EBRD granted to rms to perform investment projects in
one or more ex-socialist countries.1 Then, focusing on these credit contracts, we are able to con-
trol for part of the features that favor the entry of foreign entrepreneurs in transition countries.
Finally, we empirically test the association between the credit selection toward international
investors (namely, multinational entreprises  MNEs ) and the consolidation of the market
system during the transition process.
The micro-data we examine and the historical period we focus on help to dene a simple
identication strategy.
1The EBRD very often just partially nanced these projects.
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The rationale for our strategy is straightforward: the EBRD lending policy is expected to
match projects and country needs. At the right time, the EBRD nances the appropiate projects
that are expected to help create a competitive market system in each host destination. In this
respect, we investigate the exent to which MNEs could have a specic role in the EBRDs
development strategy by looking at the potential determinants a¤ecting the size of the EBRD
credit contracts granted to them.2
A brief discussion of the EBRDs history, policy and mission is useful here.
The EBRD was created in 1991 just after the Soviet Bloc had collapsed. Since then, its pur-
pose has been assisting the countries of that region in transforming their centrally planned eco-
nomic systems into market-oriented economies. Its mandate involves promoting private aid and
entrepreneurial initiatives including de-monopolization and privatization (Besley et al. 2010).
Owned by sixty-one countries and two intergovernmental institutions, the European Union
and the European Investment Bank with a capital of 20 billion euros, the EBRD ts the de-
nition of an international nancial institution (IFI) given by the Organization for Economic
Co-operatoin and Development (OECD, 2013). Regarding IFIs, the OECD intends that public
nancial institutions play an important role in improving credit accessibility (particularly, for
small and medium entreprises, SMEs) in developing countries. Contrary to national development
banks, an IFI is expected to provide credits when the private sector lags behind because of dif-
cult market conditions or political pressure (OECD, 2013).3 Unlike private investment banks,
the EBRD has sovereign shareholders that do not receive dividends. This feature, together with
its stable sovereign ownership, allows the EBRD to raise funds under the best conditions and to
simultaneously face the high risks inherent in investing in the region.
When the EBRD started its lending operations in 1991, the business environments of all of
ex-socialist countries were characterized by large reductions in output, the complete disorgani-
zation of production, macroeconomic and political instability, and inadequate banking sectors
(Vuylsteke, 1995). Beside certain countries were far from being fully edged democracies. The
EBRD was presented as the ideal nancial partner to grant credits in a high risk enviroment
with special attention to either native or foreign private entrepreneurs.4
2 In Damijan et al. (2013), the authors emphasize that FDI in transition countries primarly did not aim at
entering the biggest markets or take over (in the case of mergers and acquisitions) the most e¢ cient rms. If so,
another reasonable scope needs to be claried.
3These institutions focus mostly on SME programmes and favor local rms to have access to the international
trade system. IFIs are expected to intensify their credit activity when credit risk is high (and banks have lower
incentives to lend) or a country is passing through a recession period.
4According to our estimations, the share of public clients between 1991 and 2003 was about 12:5% of the total
cumulated investment.
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Attracting foreign private entrepreneurs in risky host countries is not an easy task, but
despite other experiences, the FDI entry process in former socialist countries could count on
a key player (i.e the EBRD) that de facto is able to control and drive the foreign investment
ows according to specic institutional priorities (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). In this sense, the
development process of former socialist countries at the beginning of their transition process may
not be fully assimilated to a random or uncontrolled one. Relying on the information disclosed
by credit contracts granted by the EBRD to local and foreign entrepreneurs, our goal is to depict
how and which FDI inows were prioritized by the EBRD to support the economic transition
to recipient countries.
At the beginning of the EBRDs activity, the country risk (in host markets) was high because
of the macroeconomic turmoil. All potential borrowers lacked market experience and had no
history of creditworthiness. Further, the credit-granting decisions made by the EBRD were
not a¤ected by competition because local banks were insolvent and foreign banks did not enter
these risky markets in the early transition period (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007). Inside
the transition landscape, as with any economic agent, the objective of the bank is to maximize
prots from investment projects by using all the instruments available in the nancial markets
to raise funds and protect its portfolio against risks.5
Because of its institutional mission, the EBRD also operates with another priority: to foster
entrepreneurial activities in the most e¤ective ways. However, the returns to support investments
carried out by local or international rms (MNEs) may not be always identical. In a recent
paper, García- Santana (2012) discusses the e¤ectiveness of relying on MNEs to establish a
market system in developing countries. This result stems from the lack of nancial frictions for
MNE branches when undertaking FDI in developing countries. His argument is quite intuitive:
the real e¤ectiveness of MNE investments triggering the creation of a competitive market in the
host countries hinges the possibility that MNEs nance themselves their own projects and do
not address their credit demand to the local credit market. In this sense, in former socialist
countries, the goal of supporting the transition process to the market economies can be achieved
by adopting a preferential strategy for privileging the investments of international corporations
rather than those of native rms.
The rationale of pushing economic development through MNE entry is widely discussed in
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and McGrattan and Prescott (2007). Lowering barriers
to foreign rms that bring technological advantages to the host economies yields a substantial
5 In fact, the conditions under which the EBRD operates are not totally identical to those of other investment
banks. The EBRD aims at being a catalyst for nancial institutions and wants to avoid crowding them out. In
other words, the EBRD does not see other nancial institutions as competitors (EBRD, 1999).
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increase in welfare in those territories (Damijan et al., 2013). It has been proven that this action
can be undertaken successfully by MNE, because having easy access to the international nancial
market means that they can borrow abroad and thus operate at their optimal size in the host
markets (García Santana, 2012). A clear example of this practice in developing countries is the
empirical analysis proposed by Dang (2013) for Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, the author
shows that FDI is able to not only consolidate the market system, but also improve the quality
of local institutions. This framework does not fully apply to the case of nancing investments
in transition countries. In the historical period referenced in this study, even MNEs did not
have full access to the open international credit market when considering that investments in
transition countries would have been interesting. The EBRD has always represented the key
lender. In light of the theories discussed above, one would expect that the EBRDs strategy
would be to relax requirements in order to grant credit contracts to the MNEs while being more
strict with the native rms.6
By exploiting the information disclosed by the (granted) credit contracts, we plan an econo-
metric strategy to identify similarities and di¤erences in the lending policy of the bank condi-
tional on the type of client. Then, we aim at establishing whether the EBRD lending policy
really privileged the entry of the MNE at the beginning rather than at the end of the transition
period. This result would support the hypothesis that the MNE presence was considered one of
the pillars for consolidating the market system.
In developing our analysis, we proceed as follows. In the section that follows, we provide
a wide statistical description of the EBRD-client relationship, relying on the content of our
database. In Section 3 we introduce our empirical strategy and perform our econometric exercise,
and nally, Section 4 concludes and discusses our results.
2 The EBRD-client relationship
Our analysis focuses on the very beginning of the transition process. We concentrate on all the
credit contracts granted by the EBRD from 1991 to 2003.7 In this way, we are able to track
the activity of the bank during the period in which it was acting as monopolist-credit-granter
in this geographical area. This approach will make it easier to dene an identication strategy
6To a certain extent, the institutional role of the EBRD is expected to adjust the imperfection of an incomplete
market.
7Limiting our analysis to this period allows us to focus of the intial transition time when the principal purpose
was expected to be the creation of a market economy. The period was characterized by an important privatization
process. The strategy of analysis we are proposing would not hold if we extended our time span to after 2003
when several oligarchs became important economic agents in various ex-socialist countries.
5
to test our working hypothesis.
When considering a potential client for a lending contract, the EBRD follows a standard
procedure (Vuylsteke, 1995). The bank and its client agree to sign the contract; then, the bank
nances the rm, which makes the investment and pays back the loan (plus interest) to the
bank.8
For the purposes of this study, we built an original database from public data released by
the EBRD over time.9 Our database includes 1,788 nancial contracts signed by the bank
with private and public clients from 1991 to 2003. It contains information in each case on
the identity and nationality of the clients, the amount of the contract in ECU/e, the value of
the investment project, the sector of investment, the year the contract was signed, the type of
contract (loan, share, equity, or guarantee), and other characteristics (old clients, private/public,
macro-programs, etc).10 About 10% of the contracts in the database have been signed by an
MNE as a unique borrower.11 In this section, we present a brief overview of the content of our
database and discuss the most relevant descriptive statistics.
2.1 The contracts
The number of contracts and the amount of annual investments were very low at the beginning
of the transition process (see Figures 1 and 2). The EBRD was underusing its capital, and this
underuse was a source of criticism among the shareholders and commentators. The underuse was
principally due to the severe macroeconomic downturn that a¤ected the entire region. After these
initial di¢ culties, the banks aim was to strongly increase the portfolio volume. The economic
recovery of most of the countries in the region helped the EBRD to sign more contracts and to
8 In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we intend the term "loan" to mean any kind of credit contract the
bank may propose.
9We need to clarify an important disclaimer about data at hand. Our database has been built by compiling
open-access public data. In public records, information about sensitive features at the rm level is extremely
limited or missing. Furthermore, we have no su¢ cient elements to track our sample of rms beyond the time
we are considering and match our data with other databases to control for rm performance. Despite these
limitations, the data at hand turn out to be su¢ cient to tackle the question we are interested in, and they may
also represent the backbone for potential further developments in the future.
10The codication of each entry of this database follows an ad hoc criterion driven by the necessity to organize
the public information to which we have access across time. Unfortunately, we are not able to identify each
contract with canonical identication numbers (as a VAT number, for instance) of credit recipients. Therefore,
fully merging this database with other rm-level databases to complement the missing information is not possible.
11Several contracts have been signed by a consortium of rms, and they sometimes involve the presence of a
foreign partner. However, tracking the quota of participation of the MNE in the consortium as well as qualifying
its participation to the management of the investment is not always possible. Therefore, in these cases, we prefer
to include this group of clients with the group of local rms.
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Figure 1: Number of contracts signed by the EBRD between 1991 and 2003.
make sizeable prots from 1999 onward.
According to the information released by the EBRD, the bank designed di¤erent kinds of
contracts. These contracts all represent the nancial instruments by which the bank participates
in the realization of the investment project proposed by the borrower. These contracts di¤er
not only in the maturity of the credits but also in other characteristics, which we will discuss
below. First, in Table 1, we provide a general overview of the di¤erent kinds of contracts signed
by the bank, as well as the frequency of the contracts.
[Table 1 about here]
Three (out of thirteen) main categories of credit instruments can be distinguished: loan,
share and equity, and guarantee contracts. The loan was the nancial contract most frequently
used by the EBRD between 1991 and 2003 (Table 1). A loan is generally considered a short-term
contract, lasting ve years on average and tailored to meet the particular requirements of the
project. The credit risk is usually taken by the bank or partially syndicated to the market. A
loan may be securitized by a borrowers asset or converted into shares (or both) or may be equity
linked. The second important category includes share and equity contracts. Share contracts were
signed primarly at the beginning of the EBRDs activity, whereas equity contracts represent a
broader category of nancial contracts that include share contracts too. An equity investment
can be undertaken in various forms, including subscription to ordinary shares. When the EBRD
takes an equity stake, it expects an appropriate return on its investment. The bank usually
sells its equity investment on a nonrecourse basis, has a clear exit strategy, and takes only a
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Figure 2: EBRD investments by year (ECU/e million).
minority position.12 The third category of credit instruments refers to guarantee contracts which
were used mainly at the end of our dataset period. Through this type of contract, the bank
helps borrowers to gain access to nancial sources through the provision of guarantees (EBRD,
1999).13
Tables 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics on the total values of projects that were selected by
the EBRD and the share that it e¤ectively nanced. In most accepted projects, the EBRD was
not the only lending source.14 Statistical information is given for the total population and for two
periods, one at the outset of the transition (1993-1995) and the other at the end of the sample
period (2000-2003). The total project value of loans was always higher than that of shares,
but both decreased over time. The median bank lending in loan contracts remained unchanged
over time, whereas it declined in share contracts. This fraction increased proportionally with
the total project value,15 but the increase was more pronounced for shares than for loans. As
a shareholder, the bank can control the management of the rm, which implies a reduction in
uncertainty associated with imperfect information about the rms behavior. The bank tends to
12Equity is considered to be a noncontingent contract.
13According to the OECD (2013), the di¤usion of guarantee contracts in developing countries is a device to
reduce the nancial constraints for SMEs and start-ups. This type of contract represents a positive signal from
the SMEs to the market and may entail the starting of a long-term lending relationship between those rms and
other private lenders.
14The contracts issued by the EBRD always require a conanced part which may be through cash nancing
from the rm or, in other cases, from a consortium of commercial banks. However, the involvement of commercial
banks in the credit process is strictly subject to EBRD participation. Hence, even in this case, the EBRD plays
the role of dominant credit agent.
15The correlation of these two variables is around 0.67.
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augment its participation with the size of the project value in share contracts in order to protect
itself against risk. As for loans, the collateral allows for a control of risk.
[Table 2 about here]
[Table 3 about here]
2.2 Countries and sectors
Two criteria can account for the geographical distribution of contracts between 1991 and 2003:
market size (population size or income per capita) and political regime. Figure 3 shows the
geographical distribution of EBRD investments in cumulated terms per capita by country. The
Central European countries, which are the most developed countries of the population and which
led the transition process, received the largest per capita nancing (around 300,000 euros for
Slovenia, Croatia, and Estonia), while the Central Asian countries lag behind signicantly. The
Central Asian countries have not only a poor business climate but also non-democratic institu-
tions. We perform other statistical analysis to obtain more evidence. We split the distribution
into three subperiods (1991-1995, 1996-1999, and 2000-2003). Table 4 shows that at the begin-
ning of the transition process, almost half of the investments went to the early starters, in the
Central European and Baltic states. Their share later reduced to roughly one-third of the total
because it is very likely that in these destinations, the transition process to a market system
was quickly established. During the transition process, Russia received an increasing proportion
of EBRD investment and its share remained stable. Southeastern Europe saw a progressive
increase in its share of EBRD investment during this period. The relative share in Eastern Eu-
rope and the Caucasus decreased. Finally, Central Asian countries reached a noticeable share
between 1996 and 1999, which fell by half during the nal period.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
As for the distribution by sector (Table 5),16 at the beginning of the transition, most of EBRD
nancing went to the Finance, Telecom, and Oil/Gas/Natural Resources sectors.17 Again, with
16A complete list of all the sectors is included in Appendix A.
17 In this respect, it is worth noting that private foreign banks entered transition countries to replace the general
mono-bank (active during the socialist system) with the purpose of reinforcing the transition and creating a solid
banking system (Roland, 2000). More evidence about the EBRDs role in supporting the transformation of the
local banking system is widely discussed in Fang et al. (2011). The EBRD also took a limited stake in a few banks
during the early stage of the privatization. Although this aspect of the transition period is certainly important,
this analysis goes beyond the scope of this study.
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Figure 3: Cumulated EBRD investments per capita by country (e thousands).
the priority to create a market system, in the rst period of the transition, the objectives were
to nance infrastructure and to restructure the banking and manufacturing sectors. Thereafter,
in the second stage of the development process, the focus of the bank switched to nancing the
creation of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Our principal working hypothesis is that the MNEs have been strategically selected by the
EBRD to support the transition process to a market system, above all at the very beginning
when only a few enterprises were active in the host markets. Nevertheless, one could also argue
that the strategic choice of supporting MNE projects can simply be driven by the evidence
that the types of projects MNEs carry out in transition countries concentrated in less risky (or
variable) sectors. This is not the case, however, as supported by the pertinent statistics in Table
6. Considering our whole sample and selecting the sectors accounting for at least 5% of the
overall projects nanced by the EBRD, it turns out that the percentage of nanced projects (by
sector) are identical for both the MNEs and the local rms. Furthermore, these percentages do
not vary a lot for the two most important sectors (bank and nance). Again, the data conrm
that once the bank planned the strategy to create a market system, all of its lending policy
served that purpose.
[Table 6 about here]
3 Empirical strategy
The EBRDs strategy combines both its concern about nancing feasible projects that have
positive economic returns in the host market with its expectation that the credit would be paid
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Figure 4: Distribution of value of credit contracts (in logarithm).
back by the borrower in due course. Our empirical exercise builds on these two assumptions,
and we aim to clarify the potential di¤erences in credit granting strategies when investment
projects are implemented by local or international rms.
Before proceeding with the analysis, the relationship between the value of the contract and
the value of the investment project deserves some comments. Taking the logarithm of the value
of the credit (LIV) and the logarithm of the ratio between the value of the credit and the
value of the investment project (LQ_IV), one can easily detect that no direct proportionality
exists between the value of the investment and the part nanced by the EBRD. Figures 4 and
5 represent the two kernel estimations of the previous variables.
The value of the credit is denitely a one-pick distribution, whereas the share is a two-pick
one. Therefore, the value of the credit granted by the EBRD is not just a function of the
value of a project, but also a combination of several other factors. The scope of our empirical
strategy is to learn more and clarify these further determinants under an economic development
perspective.
3.1 Econometric specication
In order to run our econometric exercise, we match data referring to a few characteristics of
the contracts signed by the bank with other data referring to the environment in which the
investment project was run. The principal di¢ culty is identifying the proper indicators to run
the estimations according to the data at hand. To that end, we refer to the current ndings in
the economic literature.
To identify the local economic environment in which investors were expected to operate in
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Figure 5: Distribution of the share of EBRDs nancing (in logarithm).
host countries, we consider four di¤erent indicators that aim at capturing the most relevant
factors a¤ecting business activity: type of regime, purchasing capacity of local citizens, degree
of trade liberalization, and advances in the privatization process as an indicator of the market
system consolidation process.
The level of local wealth, as an index of the purchasing capacity of the local population, is
represented by the value of year GDP per capita (in $). The measure of the level of development
of democratic institutions is taken from the Polity IV project. This is a coded index for the
level of democracy (DEM) of independent states. This index varies between minus ten (for an
absolute autocracy) and plus ten (for a fully edged democracy). It is obtained by combining
the evaluation of di¤erent elements (for instance, the independence of the executive authority,
openness of the executive recruitment, regulation of the chief recruitment process, and individual
participation in the election system, among the others) that allow for determining the quality
of a regimes democracy.18
Specic features of the transition process are embedded in three indicators developed by
the EBRD: governance and enterprise restructuring (GOV), large and small scale privatization
(SB_P), and trade and foreign exchange system liberalization (FOREX).
The annual values of the GOV indicator (ranging from 1 to 4 as a continuous variable) are
determined by taking into account the nancial discipline at the enterprise level, the credit and
subsidy policies for business activities, and the degree of e¤ective corporate control exercised
through the nancial institutions. The SB_P indicator (again, a continuous variable larger
18Refer to the Polity IV website for details on how the scores are computed:
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
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than 1) tracks the degree of the privatization process, referring to information on the no-state
ownership of small enterprises, the e¤ective tractability of the land, and the di¤usion of private
ownership that aims at achieving the same type of performance as in advanced countries. Finally,
the FOREX index (a continuous variable larger than 1) embeds the degree of free import/export
regime, the current account convertibility, the removal of the tari¤ barriers, and eventually the
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although these indexes are determined
via qualitative assessments, the previous indicators (namely, GOV, SB_P, FOREX and DEM)
are not strongly correlated. There is a low and positive but statistically signicant correlation
among them (when for statistical reasons all variables are considered in logarithm, refer to Table
7). The unique weak negative correlation is between the democracy and privatization process:
a reasonable assumption is that established democracies usually do not run large, important
privatization programs.
In addition to the variables controlling for the local environment of investors, we also intro-
duce some proxies for controlling some specic features of the investors that are enjoying the
credit granted by the EBRD. In line with the current literature, the size of the loan (IV) can
be interpreted as a evidence borrower quality. In an empirical test, Boot et al. (1991) establish
that larger loans, as well as loans with a longer maturity are more likely to have a lower level of
collateral. The type of contracts signed by the bank and the type of clients also reveal important
information. A bank can usually discriminate between clients by proposing di¤erent contracts
to them. Although these contracts can be grouped by type, each is often tailored to the clients
needs. Looking at the most widespread class of contracts, Inderst and Mueller (2006) conclude
that debt contracts are optimal when the lender is conservative, whereas equity contracts are
optimal when the lender is aggressive. For instance, investments by small rms in tangible assets
such as equipment or property are expected to be nanced by debts.
Our empirical strategy owes much to the previous contributions. The maturity of a credit
contract is di¤erent for each category of contract, and the type of contract is an approximate
indicator of this credit maturity, as mentioned above. We thus consider that the amount of the
credit contract is supposed to be the result of a combination of market conditions and expected
return on investment.
In addition to the value of the credit (IV) granted by the EBRD to the rm, we also take
into account features such as the type of the contract, the year it was signed, and the return on
investment. The latter can be approximated, for a solvent rm, by the value of its productive
investment (namely, logarithm data labeled LIP in the database). This investment value is the
minimum level of return of any successful productive investment by the rm, which corresponds
to its capacity for repayment. By adopting this hypothesis, we are following and extending
13
the results achieved by Holmström (1999), who proved that the investment decision and the
distinguishing characteristics of this investment represent a way to disclose the unknown char-
acteristics of an agent. Finally, since other potential importantly features of each client (for
instance, the risk evaluation of the clients, the type of collateral associated with each contract)
are unavailable, we can control only for the identity of the client by being able to discriminate
between a private or public (Public) client.19 Finally, we also introduce rm or contract xed
e¤ects to control for the omitted variables for each signed contract. A description of the variables
is given in Box 1.
[Box 1 about here]
Our empirical strategy consists of running two di¤erent estimation exercises in order to
identify the discriminating nancing strategy that favors MNE nancing over the one for local
enterprises (if any) as a device for supporting the market creation system. To this end, we rst
regress the credits granted to the two groups of rms against the same group of control variables.
In this way, we aim at assessing that the conditions yielding the credit granting to MNE are
di¤erent from the ones for local enterprises.
We formulate our rst empirical model as follows. In order to control for the very high
variance of observation in our sample, and to ensure the conditions for signicant estimations,
we take all of our variables in logarithm. Let us dene the dependent variable (value of the
credit) as Y (LIV ): The amount of the credit for nancing an investment project is dened as
LIVitjs, with i = firm; t = year, j = host country, and s = sector . We consider a group of
independent variables to be associated with the contacts (i.e., LIP and Public) and the general
market conditions in the host country (i.e., LDEM, LGDP, LFOREX, LGOV and LSB_P).We
also include an interaction term (DEMjt  yeart) between the democracy index and the time
dummies. This term is meant to track possible changes in the variable democracy over time in
each country. Therefore, the equation we consider can be dened as follows:
LIVitjs = 0 + 1LIPitjs + 2PUBLICi + 3LDEMjt + 4LGOVjt + 5LGDPjt +(1)
+6LFOREXjt + 7LSB_Pjt + 8(DEMjt  yeart) + "itjs:
Our database is not a true panel but rather a pooling of independent cross sections over
time. Hence, we need to control for heterogeneity problems. As argued in Wooldridge (2006),
19 In the case of MNEs being a Public client means being a foreign-state-owned-enterprise (usually managing a
public service such as transport activities of public facilities) that invests in a transition country. The identication
of Public is then applied to the identity of the credit applicant irrespective of the type of the investment it is
planning to carry out.
14
this pooled structure implies that the dependent variable may have di¤erent distributions in
di¤erent time periods; to control for this, we need to introduce some time xed e¤ects (t):
The same reasoning applies to the sector dimension, for which we include some sector xed
e¤ects (s): In addition, as shown, for instance, in Baltagi (2008), we also need to include
the unobservable time-invariant individual-specic e¤ect (i) to control for the heterogeneity
problem as much as possible. Controlling for all of these e¤ects allows us to decompose the error
term ("itjs) in the following way:
"itjs = i + t + s + itjs ; (2)
where i is the unobservable time-invariant individual-specic e¤ect, t the time xed e¤ects,
s the sector xed e¤ects, and itjs denotes the remaining disturbances, which are now expected
to be IID(0; 2):
The choice of the variable i turns out to be crucial for obtaining independence between the
residuals and the dependent variable. In our estimations, we are alternating rm and contract
xed e¤ects, and we will also control for rm or contract clustering errors. The contract type is
in fact time invariant according to EBRD statements. In running this rst exercise, we expect to
get di¤erent results when applying the same model to our di¤erent subsamples. In particular, in
light of the theory discussed by García-Santana (2012), it is also likely that all other regressors
will lose part of their statistical signicance in the case of MNEs, with respect to the amount
of credit the EBRD would grant MNEs on the basis of their reputation, projects, or sectors of
activity.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics for some of these variables for the overall period and
for two specic years: 1993 and 2003.20 The dependent variable is the nancing amount (IV )
granted by the EBRD. This is one of the variables in the banks prot function, which depends
negatively on the riskiness of the project.21 This reects both the screening process and the
incentive mechanism that takes place between clients. In our population, this index declines over
time because the EBRD nanced democracies in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning
of the transition and later started to nance autocratic countries in Central Asia.
The second exercise builds on the results of the rst one and aims at tackling a simple
question: is the potential discrimination of clients by native and MNE truly a device to sustain
20We prefer to discuss this evidence by referring to the original data (namely, without the logarithm transfor-
mation) to provide a realistic discussion of the available information.
21See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing.
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the creation of the market system? If this were the case, the selection of MNE projects is
expected to be more intense at the beginning of the transition period (when the democratic
process is not fully consolidated) with a reduction in intensity over time.
In order to test this hypothesis, we run the following estimation:
LIVitjs = 0 + 1LDEMjt + 2MNEi + 3LDEMjt MNEi + 4dloanitjs + (3)
+5dloanitjs MNEi + 6LGOVjt + 7LFOREXjt + 8LSB_Pjt + "itjs
In the previous equation, we gather a selected number of variables that focus on the im-
portance of some institutional variables on the size of the granted credits. First, we introduce
LDEMjt , which tracks the consolidation of a democratic system in the host economies. As
usual, LGOVjt ; LFOREXjt and LSB_Pjt are expected to capture the most salient features of
the business environment in the host markets. Furthermore, we introduce a dummy for select-
ing the credits granted to MNEi ;and the key variable of this exercise is the interaction term
between the two previous variables (LDEMjt MNEi ). If our hypothesis were true (namely,
MNEs are an important device for consolidating the market system in the host countries), the
coe¢ cient 3 is expected to be negative and statistically signicant, meaning that the size of
the credit granted to MNEs is important at the beginning of the transition period. As soon as
countries are able to consolidate the democratic regimes, the size of the credits granted to MNEs
is expected to reduce. The remaining variables capture the importance of tailoring the granted
credit to the type of clients. According to the OECD (2013), loan contracts are most extensively
used when clients are able to provide the proper collateral and allow the bank to share the lower
degree of risk. Here, we consider that MNEs as international investors have the nancial ca-
pacity to provide su¢ cient collateral to the bank. Hence, we introduce the dummy dloanitjs to
select the credit contracts granted as a loan, and the interaction term dloanitjs MNEi to track
how extensively these contracts are exploited in the case of MNEs. As in the rst exercise, we
introduce time and sector xed e¤ects as well as the interaction terms (DEMjt yeart): Finally,
we control the heteroskedasticity problem with either the White or the cluster (by contract)
correction of errors.
3.2 Results
We begin by focusing on the estimation of (1).
First, we concentrate on the full sample, and then we divide it into two groups: local rms
and MNEs. We proceed rst by assessing whether the xed e¤ect model should be preferred to
the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) model (with the F-test) by selecting the most e¢ cient
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estimation strategy, determined by choosing between contract or rm xed e¤ects. In all of
the regressions, we control for heteroskedasticity by applying either the White or the cluster
correction.22
3.2.1 The full sample
To begin we rst consider all contracts in order to identify the main factors that can inuence
the selection of credit granted by the EBRD. Table 9 shows the output of the OLS estimations
for the pool of observations when considering the year and sector dummies and an interaction
term (DEM*years), which takes into account the transition of the political regime in the host
countries toward democracy. In order to control for heteroskedasticity problems, we correct
the residuals with either the White or the cluster method. The cluster method is appropriate,
since it allows us to take into consideration the fact that one rm can apply for more than one
contract. As one might expect, the adoption of xed e¤ects in the estimation of the full sample
turns out to always be extremely signicant in the case of contract xed e¤ects but not rm
xed e¤ects. It is likely that the type of contract signed by the client is somewhat the result
of the banks screening process, and that is automatically dened by the contractual condition
a rm is required to fulll. It is also worth noting that the cluster error correction strategy
improves the quality of the estimation. The importance of adopting the cluster error correction
strategy stresses that there exist some latent components across the contracts that we need to
take into consideration and possibly disentangle.
The results we obtain are robust overall (Tables 9 and 10). The proxies of the repayment
capacity (LIP) and the GDP per capita of the host country (i.e., the level of local income) have
a positive impact on the amount of credit, conrming the existence of a potential market for
business in these countries. Being a public borrower also has a positive impact (when the
coe¢ cient is statistically signicant) on the amount of credit, which can be interpreted as a
guarantee for being a solvent client. By contrast, the group of variables representing the business
environment (LGOV, LFOREX and LSB_P) in the host country are basically not statistically
signicant, with a few exceptions where they display a negative coe¢ cient: the lack of su¢ cient
established market conditions hampers the investment activity. Instead, the LDEM index seems
to have a more signicant impact on investment attractiveness, and even its coe¢ cient is sensitive
to the type of correction (i.e., contract or rm xed e¤ects) we are adopting. The negative
sign associated with the democracy index indicates that the EBRD increasingly invests in less
democratic countries over time (see Subsection 2.2). This can be explained by the fact that
at the beginning of the transition, what little credit the EBRD granted was mostly to more
22The econometric estimations were computed with the Stata 11 package.
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democratic countries. It then increased its supply of credit to all types of regimes, and nally
increased its investment in less democratic countries as more democratic countries started to be
nanced by private investment banks. A positive and strongly signicant coe¢ cient associated
with the existence of a democratic regime in the country hosting the investments should conrm
that the strength of a property rights system is an interesting incentive for granting credit.
[Table 9 about here]
[Table 10 about here]
Having considered the full sample, we now divide the sample into two subsamples in order
to verify the robustness of our results. The rst subsample includes only local rms, and the
second is composed of MNEs.
3.2.2 Local rms
The result of the F-test shows that the xed e¤ect model (by contract) should be preferred
to the pooled model (Table 11). Instead, the rm-individual xed e¤ects perform very poorly.
Our estimate with contract xed e¤ects suggests that almost one-third of the variation in the
amount of nancing is related to the di¤erent types of contract (Baltagi, 2008; Baum, 2006). In
line with the interpretation provided above and the ndings from the theoretical literature, we
should expect the EBRD to face a higher risk when nancing the projects of independent native
rms in host markets at the beginning of their activities. Therefore, the choice of a specic
group of contracts rather than others has to be considered a strategy to protect itself against
that risk.
As for the signicance of the coe¢ cient, the value of the investment project (which we
interpret as a measure of the rms repayment capacity) is always highly signicant. The public
identity of a client turns out to be important because a public client may be considered by the
bank to be less risky than a private one. It is strongly signicant in the case of pooled OLS
estimations and also when controlling for contract xed e¤ects. These results suggest a certain
tendency to consider public agents more reliable for certain types of contracts, but less reliable
than private rms for others. Instead, the income variable (LGDP) turns out to be signicant
with the expected sign only in the case of contract xed e¤ects.23 It seems that the level of income
of the host country matters just for a selected number of projects in which local rms are likely
to run some commercial activities addressed to the local population. According to our working
hypothesis, the EBRD credit granting strategy to local entrepreneurs is expected to be subject to
23The coe¤cient is negative even in the case of rm xed e¤ects, but this is a marginal result being that the
rm xed e¤ects model preferred less than the pooled OLS one.
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the condition that the degree of market economy (in the host country) needs to achieve at least
a minimum lower bound to be e¤ective. Instead, the coe¢ cients of the variables describing the
economic environment (LGOV, LFOREX and LSB_P) are not statistically signicant at all,
whereas the coe¢ cient of the democracy variable is negative and statistically signicant only in
the case of controlling for contract xed e¤ects or clustering residuals by contracts (Table 12).24
This result tends to conrm the o¢ cial claim that the EBRD promotes democratic institutions
in transition countries regardless of the position of a country in the transition process. The
time dimension does not always seem to be relevant in a number of our specications; again,
this could embed the general idea of the EBRDs mission to foster transition from a long-run
perspective (Table 11).
[Table 11 about here]
[Table 12 about here]
To sum up, for local rms the xed e¤ects by type of contract turn out to be a good measure
for identifying certain elements of the nancing strategy of the bank over time. Each contract
signed by the bank is granted according to the individual characteristics of the client. Having
established this result, we now turn to the second subsample, composed of multinational rms,
to assess the possible di¤erences in the determinants of credit granting as compared with the
rst subsample.
3.2.3 Multinational rms
In our full sample, the total amount of credit granted to projects with an MNE as the unique
borrower is relatively small. However, despite this limitation, we can focus on this specic group
of rms to draw a rst set of conclusions about the potential importance of favoring the entry
of MNEs in transition countries as a pillar for supporting the creation of a market economy.
Referring to the descriptive statistics in Table 8, we easily detect that the average amount of
credit granted to an MNE, the size of the total investment, and the nancing share are lower
for MNEs than for local rms. This may reect the fact that MNEs can apply for credits in
international markets or pay for part of their investment in cash (as argued by Burstain, 2009,
and García-Santana, 2012). The results of our econometric estimations are presented in Tables
13 and 14. The outcomes are quite robust and consistent across the di¤erent specications.
The picture that emerges from these estimations is clearly distinguishable from the one
associated with local rms. First, the income of the host markets is never signicant: the
24Again, the positive sign in correspondence to the rm xed e¤ects should be read as not fully realiable result
because of the F-test.
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MNE investments and detached from the income level of the destination markets, meaning that
their investments target something more beyond obtaining a higher market potential for their
business. Furthermore, the size of the credit granted to MNEs always has a quite negative (and
statistically signicant) association with the level of democracy and market openness. Once
more, MNEs truly seem to be an anchor for the transition process. The EBRD seems to endorse
their entry into quite close but not fully edged democratic countries. Finally, as usual, the size
of the credit (LIP ) is positively related to the value of the project and the condition of being a
foreign public enterprise (PUBLIC )25 two positive factors that determine the size of the credit.
According to our working hypothesis, this result conrms that the EBRD credit strategy
privileges the MNE investment to foster the transition process to a market economy. Controlling
for contract xed e¤ects does change the estimation results, but these e¤ects turn out to be
important (their  is around 0.86) and help to shrink the standard errors. Our ndings suggest
that MNE investment projects were principally nanced only on the basis of their quality, sector
of destination, and the proper bank-tailored contracts to meet the needs of MNEs.
If our results were true, however, we cannot disregard that time matters: one would expect
a clear association between the contract granted to the MNE and the time it was signed. In
order to truly support the market creation process, the entry of MNEs should be favored at the
beginning of the transition process. Our nal set of estimations focuses exactly on this issue:
establishing the extent to which the size of the granted credit turned to be a device to push the
entry of MNEs in transition economies preferably at the beginning of the transition.
Table 15 displays our last set of estimations focusing on (3). First, our results are consis-
tent and robust irrespective of the di¤erent estimation strategies we adopt. The most salient
(and expected) outcome is the negative and always quite statistically signicant coe¢ cient of
the covariate LDEMjt  MNEi : According to our working hypothesis, this result conrms
that the entry of MNEs was privileged by the bank at the beginning of the transition period
when host countries were building a democratic system. The interpretation of this result is
strongly supported by the negative and again, always quite statistically signicant coe¢ cient
of the covariate embedding the status of the privatization process (LSB_P ). As soon as the
privatization process started improving, the size of the EBRD credits started reducing. Finally,
the relative singular position of MNEs in this credit granting process is also documented by the
type of contract that they were likely to enjoy. As also shown in Table 15, the negative and sta-
tistically signicant coe¢ cient of the interaction term dloanitjs MNEi reveals that the credits
granted to MNEs were transferred through forms other than the canonical loan contracts usually
25This is the case of public foreign enterprises managing the development of projects in the eld of natural
monopolies, energy, or transport services.
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exploited for nancing activities in risky markets (OECD, 2013). Once more, MNEs enjoyed a
reputation e¤ect that allowed for obtaining less binding credit contracts.
[Table 13 about here]
[Table 14 about here]
[Table 15 about here]
4 Conclusions and discussion
The dataset exploited in this study allows us to focus on the strategy adopted by the EBRD in
granting credit with respect to the type of applicant. The EBRD was in a situation of monopoly
in many transition countries, and the purpose of the activity was to support the transition to a
market economy. The EBRDs shareholders are sovereign and assigned to the bank its mission to
foster and not crowd out nancial ows toward the private sector in these countries. According
to our results, the entry of MNEs in transition countries aimed at being a pillar for consolidating
the transition to a market economy. MNEs were expected to help foster the creation of a market
economy. Some of our results conrm this hypothesis.
Let us focus on the elasticity between the credit size and the variation of the democracy
index: for local rms, the credit size it is almost inelastic (its magnitude is around 0.45%),
whereas it is extremely elastic in the case of MNE credits (around 2.45%). In the same vein,
the MNE credit size turns out to be more elastic with respect to the value of the investment
project (around 0.86%) when compared with the case of local rms, with an elasticity settling
between 0.70% and 0.80%. In the banks expectations, investments carried out by local rms
are likely to be successful in an economic environment once the path toward a market economy
is established. The sensitivity to the income level (namely GDP) is proof: credit granted to
MNEs is completely inelastic against income variations in host countries, whereas credit granted
to local rms is a bit more sensitive, with an elasticity of about 0.08%.
The need to cope with high credit risk unambiguously forces the bank to adopt measures of
protection using a client-screening scheme. As discussed in the economic literature, there is no
unique scheme available to be implemented. In our sample, a screening device as general as the
type of contract turned out to be an e¢ cient tool. In line with the ndings of Besley et al. (2010),
however, our assessment o¤ers elements to evaluate the need for potential changes to the EBRDs
credit policy in the future. Since its creation, the EBRDs priorities have been encapsulated in
the transition impact. At the early stage of the transition, the selection criteria for granting
credit were relatively clear: the priority was evident (creation of the market economy), but
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nowadays other concerns such as social and economic cohesion or occupational safety should be
taken into consideration.
Could the EBRD experience be transposed and adopted as a feasible strategy in other situa-
tions? It is undeniable that the proper selection of the projects is useful for driving the economic
development as well as attracting the most e¢ cient investors. The strategy implemented by the
EBRD, however, cannot be considered a true benchmark strategy, since it relies on this specic
feature: the EBRD operated as a monopolist in nancing investments in transition countries at
the beginning of the transition process. It was able to ne-tune foreign entry with respect to the
evolution of the local economic environment as well. It is not so evident that replicating these
types of market conditions will guarantee the attainment of the development objectives.
Nevertheless, more discussion could be generated if we were to investigate further results and
insights by completing the statistical information at hand. First, we could rene the structure
of the proposed exercise by improving the measurement of certain variables, such as investment
returns or the economic environment in host markets. Following this path would enable us
to provide a quantitative and reliable assessment of the e¤ectiveness of the nanced projects.
Second, by controlling for the success of the nanced projects, it would be possible to provide
more insight into the possible association between the optimality of the credit-screening process
and the e¤ective impact of nanced investments on host market economies. This second order
of results would be extremely important in xing reliable discriminatory criteria to provide a
quantitative benchmark for selecting the proper projects in accordance with the development
stages. By gathering information about the individual returns of the nanced investments, we
could obtain more precise data about the impact of the EBRDs nancing policies. In particular,
it could be possible to plan an exercise to discuss to the extent to which the EBRDs intervention
has been e¤ective in the long run and, eventually, the way it has been able to be a catalyst for
mobilizing private investment nancing after 2003.
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: EBRD contracts and their frequency (1991-2003)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Contract Freq. %
Debt 1 0.06
Equity 141 7.92
Guarantee 100 5.62
Line of Credit 7 0.39
Loan 949 53.31
Loan/Line of credit 1 0.06
Loan/Shares 96 5.39
Loan/Guarantee 1 0.06
Senior debt 72 4.04
Shares 404 22.70
Shares/Loan 2 0.11
Shares/Loan/Share 1 0.06
Share/Loan/Guarantee 1 0.06
Subordinated debt 4 0.22
TOTAL 1780 100
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on loans (value e mill. )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample1
Bank nancing 945 21.25 27.76 12.7 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 936 60.81 109.94 29.25 0.1 923.9
Up to 1995
Bank nancing 219 19.98 23.53 10.90 0.2 142
Tot. project value 220 68.24 115.81 31.85 0.5 923.9
From 2000 onwards
Bank nancing 438 21.19 31.36 10.00 0.1 233.76
Tot. project value 427 50.60 94.94 15.00 0.1 750
1The di¤erence between the number of observation in bank nancing and total project value is due to lack of data for one of the two
variables.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on shares (value e mill.)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Total sample
Bank nancing 402 9.05 13.93 3.2 0.1 125
Tot. project value 402 34.57 76.98 8.2 0.1 1028.9
Up to 1995
Bank nancing 84 10.14 11.82 5.9 0.1 53.4
Tot. project value 84 35.92 59.96 18.6 0.7 384.1
From 2000 onwards
Bank nancing 100 7.45 11.95 3.1 0.3 53.7
Tot. project value 99 26.87 63.57 4.8 0.5 365.8
Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Cumulated investment by region (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Regions 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Russia 19.9 29.1 28.8
Central Europe and Baltic States 45.9 32.9 36.0
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 11.8 11.9 7.5
South-Eastern Europe 16.8 13.5 20.5
Central Asia 5.6 12.6 7.2
Table 5: Descriptive statistics: Cumulated investment by sector (% )
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Sector 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2003
Finance 19.6 27.0 30.2
Environment .. 4.1 ..
Food 2.6 8.1 9.0
Telecom 14.5 6.8 4.9
Energy 9.5 9.7 8.9
Oil/Gas/Nat.Res. 10.8 10.3 8.4
Transport 8.8 3.4 16.1
Others 34.3 30.6 22.4
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics: Cumulated investment by sector and group of rms (1991-2003) (%)
(Source: EBRD, Calculus: authors)
Sector MNE Local rms
Bank 11.8 11.0
Finance 38.5 35.6
Food 20.7 6.6
Manufacturing 6.5 5.2
BOX 1: LIST OF VARIABLES
LDEM Logarithm Index of democratic level in the country hosting the investment (Polity IV)
LFOREX Logarithm of the EBRD indicator on trade liberalization and foreign exchange rate
LGDP Gross domestic product per-capita of the host country (IMF statistics)
LGOV Logarithm of the EBRD indicator on governance and entreprise restructuring
LIP Logarithm Total value of the investment project
LIV Logarithm Value of the investment nanced by the EBRD
LSB_P Logarithm of the EBRD indicator on small and large scale privatization
MNE Dummy for Multinational rm
PUBLIC Dummy variable for presence of a public client or other interests of the bank in the project
Sector Dummy by sector
Year Time dummy
Table 7: Correlation statistics
LDEM LGOV LFOREX LSB_P
LDEM 1
LGOV 0.385*** 1
LFOREX 0.207*** 0.588*** 1
LSB_P -0.107*** 0.381*** 0.414*** 1
*** 1% signicance level;
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Sample
GDP per-capita ($) 1706 2706.5 2143.6 151.48 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 1662 6.5 2.85 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill. ) 1766 16.5 24.2 0 233.7
Total project value (e mill. ) 1750 49.23 97.87 0 1028.9
Financing share 1728 0.6 0.33 0.009 1
1993
GDP per-capita ($) 68 2167 1519.7 225.8 6801.8
Polity IV index (DEM) 68 7.32 2.45 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 71 20.36 23.9 0.1 100.12
Total project value (e mill.) 71 69.98 96.95 1.3 464.7
Financing share 71 0.43 0.28 0.04 1
2003
GDP per-capita ($) 260 3292.8 2539.6 248.2 13937.4
Polity IV index (DEM) 254 6.61 3.04 0 10
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 270 13.69 23.7 0.1 230.2
Total project value(e mill.) 271 33.26 77.4 0.1 750
Financing share 270 0.69 0.34 0.01 1
MNE
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 167 9.91 14.62 0.045 95.411
Total project value(e mill.) 158 26.31 41.73 0.045 255
Financing share 156 0.57 0.356 0.049 1
Local
EBRD Credit Value (e mill.) 1599 17.18 24.84 0 233.76
Total project value(e mill.) 1592 51.51 101.5 0 1029
Financing share 1572 0.61 0.333 0.009 1
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Table 9: Econometric results: Full sample
Method of estimation: Pooled OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
OLS OLS OLS
C 0.51 (1.07) -0.62 (0.3)* 0.51 (1.06)
LIP 0.82 (0.01)*** 0.82 (0.03)*** 0.82 (0.01)***
PUBLIC 0.26 (0.07)*** 0.26 (0.05)*** 0.26 (0.07)***
LDEM -0.98 (0.61) -0.53 (0.21)** -0.98 (0.61)
LGDP 0.06 (0.03)* 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.03)*
LGOV -0.21 (0.11)* -0.21 (0.1)* -0.21 (0.11)*
LFOREX -0.16 (0.1) -0.14 (0.13) -0.16 (0.1)
LSB_P -0.08 (0.10) -0.09 (0.05)* -0.09 (0.10)
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 0.81 802.11*** 0.80
D. Sectors=0 4.61*** 5889*** 4.49***
LDEM*year=0 1.91** 4.3 e05*** 1.90 **
LDEM*year=D. Years 1.71* 2628*** 1.73*
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster Clusters
(contracts) (rm)
Adj. R-Square 0.84 0.84
OBS 1348 1342 1614
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 10
Econometric results: full sample
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C -0.96 (0.54)* 4.77 (6.68) 0.57 (0.26)** 4.77 (3.1)
LIP 0.79 (0.01)*** 0.73 (0.1)*** 0.79 (0.02)*** 0.73 (0.00)***
PUBLIC 0.19 (0.07)*** -0.49 (0.6) 0.19 (0.01)*** -0.49 (0.31)
LDEM -0.47 (0.29) 3.73 (2.06)* -1.13 (0.17)*** 3.74 (1.2)***
LGDP 0.09 (0.03)*** -0.75 (0.68) 0.09 (0.05) -0.74 (0.35)**
LGOV -0.15 (0.11) 0.18 (0.78) -0.15 (0.08)* 0.18 (0.46)
LFOREX -0.19 (0.09)** -0.15 (0.58) -0.19 (0.12) -0.15 (0.39)
LSB_P -0.83 (0.09) -0.39 (0.95) -0.08 (0.06) -0.39 (0.62)
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes yes
Fixed e¤ects Contract Firm Contract Firm
Tests:
F-test: xed vs pooled 9.30*** 0.83
u 0.39 1.17 0.39 1.16
 0.29 0.74 0.61 0.74
Robustness errors White White Cluster Cluster
(contract) (rm)
R-Square (within) 0.82 0.68 0.89 0.68
OBS 1342 1348 1342 1348
Groups 13 13
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 11
Econometric results: Local rms
Method of estimation: OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
OLS OLS OLS
C 0.42 (1.13) 0.4 (0.2) 0.42 (1.13)
LIP 0.81 (0.01)*** 0.81 (0.02)*** 0.81 (0.01)***
PUBLIC 0.22 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.04)*** 0.22 (0.07)***
LDEM -0.46 (0.58) -0.90 (0.17)*** -0.46 (0.58)
LGDP 0.05 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
LGOV -0.23 (0.12)* -0.24 (0.1)** -0.23 (0.12)*
LFOREX -0.1 (0.1) -0.08 (0.16) -0.1 (0.1)
LSB_P -0.06 (0.11) -0.07 (0.05)* -0.06 (0.11)
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 0.61 1581*** 4.37***
D. Sectors=0 4.55*** 4615*** 1.59*
LDEM*year=0 1.59* 91354*** 1.50
LDEM*year=D. Years 1.50 3.3 e05*** 0.61
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster Clusters
(contract) (rm)
Adj. R-Square 0.84 0.84 0.84
OBS 1231 1226 1231
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10% .
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Table 12
Econometric results: Local rms
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C -0.95 (0.55)* 0.86 (13.42) 0.95 (0.20)*** -2.89 (3.8)
LIP 0.78 (0.01)*** 0.70 (0.1)*** 0.78 (0.02)*** 0.69 (0.11)***
PUBLIC 0.14 (0.07)** -0.51 (0.6) 0.15 (0.02)*** -0.51 (0.33)
LDEM -0.45 (0.29) 0.1 (2.44) -0.45 (0.13)*** 1.4 (0.31)***
LGDP 0.08 (0.03)** -0.83 (0.69) 0.08 (0.04)* -0.83 (0.33)**
LGOV -0.15 (0.11) -0.08 (0.83) -0.15 (0.09) -0.08 (0.49)
LFOREX -0.13 (0.09) 0.06 (0.62) -0.13 (0.16) 0.06 (0.42)
LSB_P -0.07 (0.10) -0.15 (1.06) -0.07 (0.09) -0.14 (0.72)
Dummy years yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes yes
Fixed e¤ects Contract Firm Contract Firm
Tests:
F-test: xed vs pooled 8.36*** 0.80
u 0.40 1.5 0.40 1.71
 0.31 0.83 0.60 0.86
Robustness errors White White Cluster Cluster
(contract) (rm)
R-Square (within) 0.82 0.68 0.88 0.68
OBS 1226 1231 1226 1231
Groups 13 13
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10% .
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Table 13
Econometric results: Multinational rms
Method of estimation: OLS, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
OLS OLS OLS
C 4.03 (2.83) 17.8 (5.7)** 4.02 (2.83)
LIP 0.86 (0.05)*** 0.86 (0.08)*** 0.86 (0.05)***
PUBLIC 0.27 (0.16)* 0.27 (0.40) 0.27 (0.16)*
LDEM -2.43 (1.37)* -2.43 (0.87)** -2.43 (1.37)*
LGDP 0.04 (0.17) 0.04 (0.11) 0.04 (0.16)
LGOV 0.21 (0.50) 0.21 (0.3) 0.21 (0.49)
LFOREX -0.75 (0.4)** -0.75 (0.27)** -0.75 (0.37)**
LSB_P -0.12 (0.30) -0.11 (0.31) -0.11 (0.30)
Dummy years yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes
Tests:
D. Years=0 2.65*** 70.30*** 2.39**
D. Sectors=0 8.74*** 46078*** 8.72***
LDEM*year=0 2.54*** 42.01*** 2.40**
LDEM*year=D. Years 2.52*** 70.06*** 2.39**
Robustness errors Heterosk. Cluster Clusters
(contract) (rm)
Adj. R-Square 0.88 0.88 0.88
OBS 117 116 117
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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Table 14
Econometric results: Multinational rmsa
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 12.92 (9.42) 12.92 (6.5)*
LIP 0.85 (0.06)*** 0.86 (0.09)***
PUBLIC 0.95 (0.7) 0.95 (0.25)***
LDEM -4.74 (4.31) -4.74 (1.40)**
LGDP 0.03 (0.15) 0.03 (0.1)
LGOV 0.18 (0.5) 0.18 (0.50)
LFOREX -0.7 (0.46) -0.70 (0.22)**
LSB_P -0.21 (0.32) -0.21 (0.30)
Dummy years yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes
Fixed e¤ects Contract Contract
Tests:
F-test: xed vs pooled 2.98***
u 1.47 1.46
 0.86 0.86
Robustness errors White Cluster
(contract)
R-Square (within) 0.87 0.88
OBS 116 116
Groups 8 8
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10% ; a Firm-xed e¤ects estimations cannot be run for lack of su¢ cient observations.
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Table 15
Econometric results: Testing the support to development
Method of estimation: Fixed e¤ects, Value in brackets: Std Error,
Dependent variable: LIV
OLS OLS OLS Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects Fixed e¤ects
C 1.90 (2.72) 1.9 (2.71) 1.87 (0.52)*** -0.03 (5.2) 2.10 (2.4) -0.03 (3.29) 2.10 (0.58)***
LDEM -0.14 (1.19) -0.14 (1.18) -0.15 (0.27) 7.07 (2.68)** 0.52 (1.15) 7.07 (1.83)*** 0.52 (0.18)**
MNE 0.94 (0.71) 0.94 (0.72) 0.98 (0.63) 14.87 (7.07)** 0.96 (0.8) 14.87 (4.2)*** 0.96 (0.56)
LDMNE -0.58 (0.33)* -0.58 (0.34)* -0.57 (0.26)* -6.31(3.21)* -0.54 (0.39) -6.31 (1.7) *** -0.53 (0.23)**
d_Loan 0.81 (0.09)*** 0.81 (0.09)*** 0.82 (0.13)*** 0.56 (0.35) (dropped) 0.55 (0.23)** (dropped)
d_LMNE -0.49 (0.26) -0.05 (0.27) -0.09 (0.16) -3.6 (1.2)*** -0.19 (0.24) -3.59 (0.72)*** -0.19 (0.14)
LGOV 0.24 (0.18) 0.24 (0.18) 0.23 (0.16) 0.09 (1.01) 0.28 (0.20) 0.09 (0.90) 0.28 (0.19)
LFLOREX 0.14 (0.21) 0.14 (0.22) 0.19 (0.58) 0.06 (0.75) 0.17 (0.18) 0.05 (0.85) 0.17 (0.58)
LSB_P -1.01 (0.19)*** -1.01 (0.19)*** -1.03 (0.46)** -0.83 (1.28) -0.98 (0.19)*** -0.83 (1.2) -0.98 (.048)*
Dummy years yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dummy sectors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
LDEM*years yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Fixed e¤ects Firm Contract Firm Contract
u 2.67 0.89 2.67 0.89
 0.89 0.33 0.89 0.33
Robustness errors Whire Cluster Cluster White White Cluster Cluster
(Firm) (Contract) (Firm) (Contract)
R-Square (within) 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.24 0.41 0.24
OBS 1366 1366 1366 1366 1359 1366 1359
*** 1% signicance level; ** 5%; * 10%
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A Appendix: List of sectors
The following table shows all the sectors that rms asking for a nance belong to:
Banking, Finance and holding Local services (water, waste...)
Chemical (including Pharmaceutical) Media
Education Manufacturing
Electronic and Hi-Tech Metal
Energy Natural resources
Environment Oil and gas
Food and beverage (incl. agriculture) Real estate
Health and personal care Telecommunication
Hotels and tourism Trade and retail
Infrastructure (transport) Vehicles
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